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On Noncoercive Establishment

University of Chicago

In this essay, I raise the question of whether some degree of noncoercive state support for religious conceptions(broadly understood) should be left to the majoritarian branch of government. I argue that the reason not to do so is that such state support would alienate many citizens. However, to take this as a sufficient reason to constrain the majoritarian branch is to accept the thesis that not being alienated from one’s polity is a significant part of the human good. Those who would prohibit even a small amount of noncoercive support of religious conceptions must appeal either to pragmatic considerations (the worry that noncoercive will lead to coercive support, i.e., to tyranny) or to a conception of the good that puts great value on the agent’s sense of connectedness to the polity. And the latter is something that reasonable citizens in a modern democracy could reasonably reject.

Key Words: establishment • religion • democracy • liberalism

Political Theory, Vol. 33, No. 6, 812-839 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0090591705280371


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